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ABSTRACT
The problem of cross-platform binary code similarity detection
aims at detecting whether two binary functions coming from dif-
ferent platforms are similar or not. It has many security applica-
tions, including plagiarism detection, malware detection, vulnera-
bility search, etc. Existing approaches rely on approximate graph-
matching algorithms, which are inevitably slow and sometimes
inaccurate, and hard to adapt to a new task. To address these issues,
in this work, we propose a novel neural network-based approach to
compute the embedding, i.e., a numeric vector, based on the control
flow graph of each binary function, then the similarity detection
can be done efficiently by measuring the distance between the
embeddings for two functions. We implement a prototype called
Gemini. Our extensive evaluation shows that Gemini outperforms
the state-of-the-art approaches by large margins with respect to
similarity detection accuracy. Further, Gemini can speed up prior
art’s embedding generation time by 3 to 4 orders of magnitude and
reduce the required training time from more than 1 week down to
30 minutes to 10 hours. Our real world case studies demonstrate
that Gemini can identify significantly more vulnerable firmware
images than the state-of-the-art, i.e., Genius. Our research show-
cases a successful application of deep learning on computer security
problems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Given two binary functions, we would like to detect whether they
are similar. This problem is known as “binary code similarity detec-
tion,” which has many security applications, such as plagiarism de-
tection, malware detection, vulnerability search, etc. Among these
security applications, vulnerability search in firmware images of
IoT devices is particularly critical and more crucial than ever. A
single bug at source code level may spread across hundreds or more
devices that have diverse hardware architectures and software plat-
forms. The study by Cui et al. showed that 80.4% of vendor-issued
firmware is released with multiple known vulnerabilities, and many
recently released firmware updates contain vulnerabilities in third-
party libraries that have been known for over eight years [12].
Security practitioners face an increasing need to quickly detect
similar functions directly in binaries across multiple platforms, e.g.,
x86, ARM, or MIPS. Only recently, researchers have started to tackle
the problem of cross-platform binary code similarity detection [16,
18, 31]. These efforts propose to extract directly from binary code
various robust platform-independent features for each node in the
control flow graph to represent a function. Then, to conduct a binary
code similarity detection, a graph matching algorithm is used to
check whether two functions’ control flow graph representations
are similar [16, 31]. On the other hand,Genius [18] learns high-level
feature representations from the control flow graphs and encodes
(i.e., embeds) the graphs into embeddings (i.e., high dimensional
numerical vectors). To compute the embedding of a binary function,
however, it also relies on graph matching algorithms to compute
the similarity between the target function and a codebook of binary
functions.
Unfortunately, such graph matching-based approaches have two
inevitable drawbacks. First, the similarity function approximated
by fixed graph matching algorithms is hard to adapt to different
applications. For example, given two pieces of binary code which
differ in only a few instructions, in the application of plagiarism de-
tection, they may be considered as similar, since the majority of the
code is identical; but in the application of vulnerability search, they
may be considered dissimilar, since a few instructions’ difference
may fix an important vulnerability. A manually designed similarity
function cannot fit in both scenarios by nature.
Second, the efficiency of all similarity detection approaches based
on graph matching is bounded by the efficiency of the graph match-
ing algorithms (such as bipartite graph matching). However, the
graph matching algorithms are slow, i.e., requiring super-linear
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runtime in the graph size. Thus such approaches are inevitably
inefficient.
In recent years, deep learning [28] has been applied to many
application domains, including binary analysis [42], and has shown
stronger results than other approaches. The advantage of deep
neural networks is that they can represent a binary analysis task,
e.g., generating embedding for a binary function, as a neural net-
work whose parameters can be trained end-to-end, so that it relies
on as little domain knowledge (e.g., graph matching in previous
approaches) as possible. Further, a deep neural network-based ap-
proach can be adaptive by design, since the neural network can
be trained with different data to fit into different application sce-
narios or tasks. Also, a deep neural network model can be com-
puted efficiently, i.e., with runtime linear to the input-size and the
network-size.
Inspired by these advantages, in this work, we propose a deep
neural network-based approach to generate embeddings for binary
functions for similarity detection. In particular, assuming a binary
function is represented as a control-flow graph with attributes at-
tached to each node, we use a graph embedding network to convert
the graph into an embedding. Previously, graph embedding net-
works have been proposed for classification and regression tasks in
domains such as molecule classification [13]. However, our work is
in similarity detection, which is different from classification, and
thus their approach does not apply to our task directly. Instead,
we propose a new approach to computing graph embedding for
similarity detection, by combining graph embedding networks into
a Siamese network [7] that naturally captures the objective that
the graph embeddings of two similar functions should be close to
each other and vice versa. This entire network model can then be
trained end-to-end for similarity detection.
Further, we design a new training and dataset creation method
using a default policy to pre-train a task-independent graph em-
bedding network. Our approach constructs a large-scale training
dataset using binary functions compiled from the same source code
but for different platforms and compiler optimization levels. Our
evaluation demonstrates that this task-independent model is more
effective and generalize better to unseen functions than the state-
of-the-art graph matching-based approach [18].
One advantage of the neural network-based approach is that
the pre-trained model can be retrained quickly in the presence
of additional supervision to adapt to new application scenarios.
Our evaluation shows that with such additional supervision, the
retrained model can efficiently adapt to novel tasks. Different from
previous approaches such as Genius, which would take more than
a week to retrain the model, training a neural network is very
efficient, and each retraining phase can be done within 30 minutes.
This efficiency property enables practical usage of the retraining to
improve the quality of similarity detection.
We have implemented a prototype called Gemini. Our evalu-
ations demonstrate that Gemini outperforms the state-of-the-art
approaches such as Genius [18] by large margins with respect to
both accuracy and efficiency. For accuracy, we apply Gemini to
the same tasks used by Genius to evaluate both task-independent
and task-specific models. For the former, the AUC (Area Under the
Curve) of our pre-trained task-independent model is 0.971, whereas
AUC for Genius is 0.913. For the latter, from a real-world dataset,
our task-specific models can identify on average 25 more vulnera-
ble firmware images than Genius among top-50 results. Note that
previous approaches do not provide the flexibility to incorporate
additional task-specific supervision efficiently. Thus the retraining
process is a unique advantage of our approach over previous work.
For efficiency, Gemini is more efficient than Genius in terms
of both embedding generation time and training time. For embed-
ding generation, Gemini is 2400× to 16000× faster than the Genius
approach. For training time, training an effective Gemini model
requires less than 30 minutes, while training Genius requires more
than one week.
In a broader scope, this work showcases a successful example
of how to apply deep learning to solve important and emerging
computer security problems and substantially improves over the
state-of-the-art results.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We propose the first neural network-based approach to
generating embeddings for binary functions;
• We propose a novel approach to train the embedding net-
work using a Siamese network so that a pre-trained model
can generate embedding to be used for similarity detection;
• We propose a retraining approach so that the pre-trained
model can take additional supervision to adapt to specific
tasks;
• We implement a prototype called Gemini. Our evaluation
demonstrates that on a test set constructed from OpenSSL,
Gemini can achieve a higher AUC than both Genius and
other state-of-the-art graph matching-based approach;
• Our evaluation shows that Gemini can compute the em-
bedding 3 to 4 orders of magnitude faster than prior art,
i.e., Genius;
• We conduct case studies using real-world firmware images.
We show that using Gemini we can find significantly more
vulnerable firmware images than Genius.
2 BINARY CODE SIMILARITY DETECTION
In this section, we first use cross-platform binary code search as
an example to explain the problem to design a similarity detection
function. We then explain existing approaches, while providing a
demonstration on how an efficient embedding function can help
with designing a similarity function. In the end, we present our
approach to use a neural network as the embedding function, and
the benefits of such an approach.
2.1 Motivation Problem: Cross-Platform
Binary Code Search
Consider the problem of cross-platform binary code similarity de-
tection. Given a binary function of interest (e.g., one that contains
the Heartbleed vulnerability), we would like to examine a large
corpus of binary functions (e.g., ones extracted from firmware im-
ages of various IoT devices) and quickly and accurately identify
a list of candidates that are semantically equivalent or similar to
the function of interest. We call the binary function of interest the
query function, and the corpus of binary functions the target corpus.
A technique for this problem can be applied to many security ap-
plications, such as bug search in firmware images and plagiarism
detection in binary code, etc.
The core of this problem is the design of a function to detect
whether two functions are similar or not. An effective approach for
this problem needs to achieve the following design goals:
• Binary only. In practice, we often do not have access to
the source code of the binary functions. As a result, an
effective similarity detection and code search technique
must work on binary code directly.
• Cross-platform support. Since the query function and
the functions in the target corpus may come from different
hardware architectures and software platforms, an effec-
tive binary search technique must tolerate the syntactic
variations introduced by different platforms and capture
the intrinsic characteristics of these binary functions.
• High precision. An effective binary code similarity detec-
tor should be able to assign a high score to a pair of similiar
functions, and a low score to a pair of irrelevant ones.
• High efficiency. The similarity function should be com-
puted efficiently for the vulnerability search system and
other applications to scale to a large target corpus.
• Adaptive. When domain experts can provide similar or
dissimilar examples, the similarity function should be able
to be adapted quickly to these examples for the domain-
specific application.
2.2 Existing Techniques
While there has been a series of efforts on binary code matching
and search, most of them only work on binary code for a single
platform [14, 32].
Only recently, researchers have started to tackle this problem in
a cross-platform setting. These efforts propose to extract various
features from binary code directly that are robust enough to persist
across different architectures and compiler optimization options.
Pairwise Graph Matching. The approach by Pewny et al. [31]
extracts input–output pairs for each basic block as its feature (or
label) in the control flow graph, and then it performs graph match-
ing. Unfortunately, this is a very expensive process: the calculation
of input–output pairs and the graph matching are both expensive.
To improve efficiency, discovRE [16] is proposed to extract more
lightweight syntax level features (e.g., the number of arithmetic
instructions and the number of call instructions) instead to speed up
the feature extraction and to apply pre-filtering by simple function-
level features before graph matching to improve the search effi-
ciency. However, according to Feng et al. [18], this pre-filtering
approach is not reliable and may cause significant degradation in
search accuracy. Fundamentally, both approaches rely on pairwise
graph matching to detect similarity, which are inevitably inefficient.
Graph Embedding. In order to achieve scalability and high accu-
racy simultaneously, we would like to learn an indexable feature
representation from the control flow graph. In other words, we need
to encode (i.e., embed) a graph representation into an embedding,
i.e., a numeric feature vector. In doing so, the similarity function
can be computed as an easy-to-compute distance function between
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Figure 1: Cross-platform Binary Code Search Workflow
Type Attribute name
Block-level attributes
String Constants
Numeric Constants
No. of Transfer Instructions
No. of Calls
No. of Instructions
No. of Arithmetic Instructions
Inter-block attributes No. of offspringBetweenness
Table 1: Basic-block attributes
two vectors, which is thus efficient. Also, the feature vectors can
be indexed using a locality sensitive hashing (LSH) based database
so that a search query can be executed in O(1) time.
Feng et al. [18] were the first to apply this approach to the vulner-
ability search problem. They proposed Genius, a graph embedding
workflow, illustrated in Figure 1. Given a binary function (from
either a firmware image or a known vulnerability), Genius first
extracts raw features in the form of an attributed control flow graph
(ACFG). In an ACFG, each vertex is a basic block labeled with a
set of attributes. Table 1 lists six block-level attributes and two
inter-block attributes used in Genius. Figure 2 illustrates an ACFG
for a function in OpenSSL containing the Heartbleed vulnerability.
Each ACFG is then converted into a high-level embedding, which
is stored into a hash table using locality sensitive hashing (LSH).
Consequently, to identify a set of binary functions that are similar
to the query function, we just need to find the corresponding em-
bedding of the query function and find the nearby embeddings in
the target corpus.
The key component is how to convert ACFGs into their embed-
dings. Genius takes a codebook-based approach to embedding an
ACFG. It uses a clustering algorithm to train a codebook consisting
of a number of representative ACFGs identified for each cluster.
Then, to convert an ACFG to a feature vector, Genius measures
the similarity between the specified ACFG and each representative
Figure 2: An example of a code graph on Function
dtls1_process_heartbeat (Heartbleed vulnerability)
ACFG in the codebook using the bipartite graph matching algo-
rithm. Consequently, these similarity measures form the feature
vector of the specified ACFG.
While the idea of graph embedding is inspiring and convincing,
the use of a codebook and graph matching has several limitations.
First, codebook generation is a very expensive process, as pairwise
graph matching has to be conducted for each pair of control flow
graphs in the training dataset, and then spectral clustering needs
to be performed. As a result, the quality of the generated codebook
is limited by the scale of the training dataset. Second, the runtime
overhead of graph embedding increases linearly with the code-
book size (i.e., the number of control flow graphs in the codebook).
Therefore, the codebook size has to be small,1 which confines the
fidelity of graph encoding. Last but not least, the search accuracy
of this approach is ultimately bounded by the quality of bipartite
graph matching [35]. As an approximate algorithm, bipartite graph
matching may not always produce optimal matching results.
2.3 Neural Network-based Embedding
Generation
In this paper, we propose to take a neural network-based approach
to embedding an ACFG, to overcome the limitations in previous
graph matching-based approaches. Our approach employs a neural
network to transform an ACFG into an embedding. We will dis-
cuss the details in Section 3. In doing so, our approach has several
advantages over previous work:
Better accuracy.Our neural network-based embedding can achieve
significantly better accuracy than both bipartite graph matching
and Genius, for two main reasons. First, neural network-based
graph embedding does not rely on bipartite graph matching at all.
Instead, it evaluates the graphical representation as a whole, by
iteratively propagating embedding throughout the control flow
graph. Second, the parameters in the neural network are automati-
cally learned to maximize our embedding objective: the distance
between the embeddings of two similar ACFG should be minimized,
116 was chosen as the codebook size in the paper by Feng et al. [18]
whereas the distance between the embeddings of two dissimilar
ACFGs should be maximized. Further, the neural network-based
approach allows the model to be retrained with additional supervi-
sion from domain experts to better adapt to a new task/scenario,
so as to further improve the accuracy.
Higher embedding efficiency. The graph embedding in Genius
is very slow, as it has to perform bipartite graph matching with each
ACFG in the codebook. In comparison, our neural network model is
cheap to compute. Further, all computations in the neural network
can be parallelized to leverage the massively parallel computing
hardware (i.e., multi-core CPUs and GPUs). Another performance
boost comes from not requiring inter-block attributes. In order to
achieve good graph matching results, Genius extracts inter-block
attributes: the number of offspring and betweenness, which are
on average 8× more expensive to compute than the block-level
attributes. Our neural network model, on the other hand, requires
only basic block-level attributes and the number of offspring (which
is cheap to compute) to achieve high accuracy. The neural network
model already incorporates the inter-block relation information into
the embedding; thus these inter-block attributes (e.g., betweenness)
are not needed to achieve high accuracy.
Faster offline training. In order to compute a codebook, Genius
needs to compute a distance matrix for a large set of training ACFGs,
whose time complexity is quadratic in the number of training sam-
ples, and linear in the cost of the bipartite graphmatching algorithm.
In contrast, the neural network approach only requires training for
a constant number of epochs, each of which has a time complexity
linear in the size of the training data. As a result, Genius requires
more than 1 week to generate the codebook, while our approach
can train a neural network model within 30 minutes, which enable
practical applications using retraining.
3 NEURAL NETWORK-BASED MODEL FOR
EMBEDDING GENERATION
We first introduce the code similarity embedding problem in Sec-
tion 3.1 and then present an overview of our solution in Section 3.2.
We then explain two important modules of our approach, i.e.,
the graph embedding network and the overall architecture (Sec-
tion 3.3), and training approach (Section 3.4). How to acquire a task-
independent model through pre-training and task-specific models
through re-training are discussed in Section 3.5.
3.1 Code Similarity Embedding Problem
As aforementioned, this code similarity measure can be task depen-
dent. We assume there exists an oracle π determining the code simi-
larity metric for a given task, which is unknown that we would like
to learn. Given two binary program functions f1, f2, π (f1, f2) = 1
indicates that they are similar; otherwise, π (f1, f2) = −1 indicates
that they are dissimilar.
Here, the oracle π is specific to each task, and is typically un-
known. In certain tasks, a limited number of instances of ⟨f1, f2,
π (f1, f2)⟩ triple can be observed. For example, the domain experts
may be able to provide some ground truth data about the oracle π .
The objective of code similarity embedding problem is to find a
mapping ϕ which maps the ACFG of a function f to a vector repre-
sentation µ. Intuitively, such an embedding should capture enough
information for detecting similar functions. That is, given an easy-
to-compute similarity function Sim(·, ·), (e.g., cosine function of two
vectors), and two program binary functions f1, f2, Sim(ϕ(f1),ϕ(f2))
is large if π (f1, f2) = −1, and is small otherwise.
One advantage of learning the embedding (i.e., the mapping ϕ)
is that it enables efficient computation. The similarity between two
functions can be computed using an inexpensive similarity function
between two vectors, without incurring the cost of expensive graph
matching algorithms.
As aforementioned, using a neural network to approximate
the embedding function is particularly appealing, since it can be
quickly retrained to adapt to a given task easily when limited task-
dependent ground-truth data is provided. Also, computing a neural
network-based embedding does not rely on any expensive graph
matching algorithms, and thus can be implemented efficiently.
3.2 Solution Overview
In this section, we present the key ideas of our solution to the code
similarity embedding problem. In this work, we assume the binary
code of a function f is represented by its ACFG д. In the following,
we will use the terms “the binary code [of a function]” and “ACFG”
interchangeably.
We design the embedding mapping ϕ as a neural network. Since
the input is an ACFG, we will leverage previous graph embedding
networks from the machine learning community to address the
problem [13]. However, in Dai et al.’s work [13], the graph em-
bedding network is designed for a classification problem, which
requires label information to train the model.
In contrast, our code similarity embedding problem is not a
classification problem. Thus existing approaches do not apply di-
rectly, and we need to design a novel approach to train the graph
embedding network for the similarity detection problem.
To tackle this challenge, we propose a new learning approach.
The idea is that instead of training the graph embedding network
ϕ to do well on a particular predictive task, we will train ϕ to do
well on differentiating the similarity between two input ACFGs.
In particular, we design a Siamese architecture [7] and embed the
graph embedding network Structure2vec [13] into it. A Siamese
architecture takes two functions as its input, and produces the sim-
ilarity score as the output. This enables the model to be trained
end-to-end with only supervision on a graph-pair д1,д2 as input
and the ground truth π (f1, f2) as output, without any additional
hand-crafted heuristics on how the embeddings should be gener-
ated. Thus, such an approach is more robust and easier to adapt to
different tasks. We explain more details on this overall architecture
and training in Section 3.4.
Training a Siamese architecture requires a large number of pairs
of similar functions, as well as pairs of dissimilar functions. How-
ever, in most tasks, the ground truth data is limited. To address this
issue, we use a default policy that considers equivalent functions
(i.e., binary functions compiled from the same source code) are
similar, and inequivalent functions are not, so that we can easily
generate a large training set given a collection of source code. We
can use this dataset to pre-train a task-independent model, that can
be effective for most tasks. Further, to incorporate the little available
ground truth data for a task-specific policy, our approach allows the
model to be retrained to incorporate task-specific data. We explain
task-independent pre-training and task-specific re-training in more
detail in Section 3.5.
3.3 Graph Embedding Network
Our graph embedding network is adapted from Structure2vec, by
Dai et al. [13]. Denote an ACFG as д = ⟨V , E⟩ where V and E are
the sets of vertices and edges respectively; furthermore, each vertex
v in the graph may have additional features xv which correspond
to basic-block features in an ACFG. The graph embedding network
will first compute a p dimensional feature µv for each vertexv ∈ V ,
and then the embedding vector µд of д will be computed as an
aggregation of these vertex embeddings. That is µд := Av ∈V (µv ),
where A is an aggregation function, i.e., summation or average. In
this work, we choose µд =
∑
v ∈V (µv ) and leave the exploration of
using other aggregation functions as future work.
In the following, we first explain more details about the generic
graph embedding network, and then present the variants instanti-
ated specifically for our ACFG embedding problem.
Basic Structure2vec Approach. Structure2vec is inspired by
graphical model inference algorithms where vertex-specific fea-
tures xv are aggregated recursively according to graph topology
д. After a few steps of recursion, the network will produce a new
feature representation (or embedding) for each vertex which takes
into account both graph characteristics and long-range interaction
between vertex features. More specifically, we denote N (v) as the
set of neighbors of vertex v in graph д. Then one variant of the
Structure2vec network will initialize the embedding µ(0)v at each
vertex as 0, and update the embeddings at each iteration as
µ
(t+1)
v = F
(
xv ,
∑
u ∈N (v)
µ
(t )
u
)
, ∀v ∈ V . (1)
In this fixed-point update formula, F is a generic nonlinear map-
ping which we will specify our choice later. Based on the update
formula, one can see that the embedding update process is carried
out based on the graph topology, and in a synchronous fashion. A
new round of embedding sweeping across the vertices will start
only after the embedding update for all vertices from the previous
round has finished. It is easy to see that the update also defines a
process where the vertex features xv are propagated to the other
vertices via the nonlinear propagation function F . Furthermore,
the more iterations one carries out the update, the farther away a
vertex feature will propagate to distant vertices and get aggregated
nonlinearly at distant vertices. In the end, if one terminates the
update process after T iterations, each vertex embedding µ(T )v will
contain information about its T -hop neighborhood determined by
both graph topology and the involved vertex features.
Instead of manually specifying the parameters in the nonlinear
mapping F , we learn these parameters. To train a Structure2vec
model which is originally designed for a classification problem,
previous work requires a ground truth label for every input graph д
to indicate which “class" it belongs to. Then the model is linked with
a Softmax-layer, so that the entire model can be trained end-to-end
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Figure 3: Graph Embedding Network
by minimizing the cross-entropy loss. As discussed in Section 3.2,
this approach is not applicable to our case since our problem is not
a classification problem.
Instead, we train these parameters in F together with other
parameters end-to-end in the Siamese architecture which uses these
embeddings for computing similarity, as explained in Section 3.4.
Our Parameterization for F .We now discuss our paramemeteri-
zation ofF using a neural network. Figure 3 visualizes our network
architecture. In particular, we design F to have the following form
F (xv ,
∑
u ∈N (v)
µu ) = tanh(W1xv + σ (
∑
u ∈N (v)
µu )) (2)
where xv is a d-dimensional vector for graph node (or basic-block)
level features,W1 is a d × p matrix, and p is the embedding size as
explained above. To make the nonlinear transformation σ (·) more
powerful, we will define σ itself as ann layer fully-connected neural
network:
σ (l) = P1 × ReLU(P2 × ...ReLU(Pnl))︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
n levels
where Pi (i = 1, ...,n) is a p × p matrix. We refer to n as the embed-
ding depth. Here, ReLU is the rectified linear unit, i.e., ReLU(x) =
max{0,x}.
Our novel parameterization of the update function F together
with the iterative update scheme described in Section 3.5 com-
pletes our embedding network for ACFGs. The overall algorithm
for generating the embedding for each ACFG is summarized in Al-
gorithm 1. In the algorithm,W2 is another p×p matrix to transform
the embedding vector. We denote its output as ϕ(д).
3.4 Learning Parameters Using Siamese
Architecture
In this section, we explain our design of the overall network ar-
chitecture to train a graph embedding for similarity detection. In
particular, we use the Siamese architecture combinedwith the graph
Algorithm 1 Graph embedding generation
1: Input: ACFG д = ⟨V , E ,x⟩
2: Initialize µ(0)v = 0, for all v ∈ V
3: for t = 1 to T do
4: for v ∈ V do
5: lv =
∑
u ∈N (v) µ
(t−1)
u
6: µ(t )v = tanh(W1xv + σ (lv ))
7: end for
8: end for{fixed point equation update}
9: return ϕ(д) :=W2(∑v ∈V µ(T )v )
embedding Structure2vec network. The Siamese architecture
uses two identical graph embedding networks, i.e., Structure2vec,
which join at the top. Each graph embedding network will take one
ACFG дi (i = 1, 2) as its input and outputs the embedding ϕ(дi ).
The final outputs of the Siamese architecture is the cosine distance
of the two embeddings. Further, the two embedding networks share
the same set of parameters; thus during training the two networks
remain identical. The overall architecture is illustrated in Figure 4.
Given a set of K pairs of ACFGs ⟨дi ,д′i ⟩, with ground truth
pairing information yi ∈ {+1,−1}, where yi = +1 indicates that
дi and д′i are similar, i.e. π (дi ,д′i ) = 1, or yi = −1 otherwise. We
define the Siamese network output for each pair as
Sim(д,д′) = cos(ϕ(д),ϕ(д′)) = ⟨ϕ(д),ϕ(д
′)⟩
| |ϕ(д)| | · | |ϕ(д′)| |
where ϕ(д) is produced by Algorithm 1.
Then to train the the model parametersW1, P1, . . . , Pn , andW2,
we will optimize the following objective function
min
W1,P1, ...,Pn,W2
K∑
i=1
(Sim(дi ,д′i ) − yi )2. (3)
Embedding 
Network
𝜙(⋅)
Embedding 
Network
𝜙(⋅)
g1 g2
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝜇1, 𝜇2
{+1, −1}
𝜇1 𝜇2
Figure 4: Siamese Architecture
We can optimize the objective (3) with stochastic gradient descent.
The gradients of the parameters are calculated recursively accord-
ing to the graph topology. In the end, once the Siamese network
can achieve a good performance (e.g., using AUC as the measure),
the training process terminates, and the trained graph embedding
network can convert an input graph to an effective embedding
suiteable for similarity detection.
3.5 Task-independent Pre-training and
Task-specific Re-training
Training the model requires a large amount of data on the ground
truth about oracle π , which may be difficult to obtain. To tackle
this issue, we construct a training dataset using a default policy.
This dataset can be used to pre-train a task-independent model that
is effective for most common tasks. When additional task-specific
data becomes available, we allow the pre-trained model to be re-
trained quickly to acquire a task-specific model. We explain these
two approaches below.
Task-independent Pre-training. To pre-train a model applicable
to most common tasks, intuitively, the generated embedding of each
function should try to capture invariant features of the function
across different architectures and compilers. We implement this
intuition by constructing a dataset as follows using a default oracle.
Assuming a set of source code is collected, we can compile them
into program binaries for different architectures, using different
compilers, and with different optimizations. In doing so, the default
oracle determines that two binary functions are similar if they are
compiled from the same source code, or dissimilar otherwise. To
construct the training dataset, for each binary function д, one other
similar function д1 and one dissimilar function д2 are sampled to
construct two training samples, ⟨д,д1,+1⟩ and ⟨д,д2,−1⟩. In our
evaluation (Section 4.2), we demonstrate that the model pre-trained
using this training method performs better than the state-of-the-art
graph matching-based approach [18] using the same task evaluated
in [18].
Task-specific Re-training. Sometimes, the policy used by a spe-
cific task may deviate from the default policy used to pre-train the
model. In this case, we need an efficient way to fine-tune the learned
parameters in the graph embedding network by using a small num-
ber of additional data ⟨f , f ′,π (f , f ′)⟩ provided by domain experts.
The re-training procedure refines the graph embedding network
by incorporating the small number of additional data about the
task-specific policy provided by domain experts.
More specifically, assume we get a list of function pairs ⟨дi ,д′i ⟩,
and their ground truth label π (дi ,д′i ) from human experts, we can
generate additional ACFG pairs to retrain the graph embedding
networkϕ(д). In particular, for each ACFG pairдi ,д′i in the provided
list, we augment the training set with a pair ⟨дi ,д′i ⟩ with pairing
information yi = π (дi ,д′i ) which is the label from human experts.
Using this augmented dataset, we further train the graph em-
bedding network for a few more (e.g., 5) epochs. In each epoch, the
newly added pairs will be sampled more often than the old data
(e.g., 50 times more often). After the augmented training is finished,
the re-trained network ϕ(·) will be deployed for the similarity de-
tection task. Such a retraining procedure allows human experts to
provide feedback to the system and the model to be fine-tuned to
be adaptive to the task-specific oracle π , and thus improves the
similarity detection accuracy further.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate Gemini with respect to its search ac-
curacy and computation efficiency. In particular, we evaluate the
accuracy of our task-independent pre-trained model using a dataset
containing ground truth. We further use real-world datasets to
study how well our model can be retrained to adapt to new tasks.
In all evaluations, our approach exhibits superior advantages over
the state-of-the-art approach [18].2
4.1 Implementation and Setup
Our system consists of two main components: ACFG extractor,
neural network model for graph embedding. We obtain the ACFG
extractor, a plug-in to the disassembly tool IDA Pro [1], from the
authors of Genius [18], so we can make sure that the raw features
extracted from the binary code are consistent with those extracted
by Genius. We implement the neural network model in Tensor-
Flow [2] in Python.
Our experiments are conducted on a server equipped with two
Intel Xeon E5-2620v4 CPUs (32 cores in total) running at 2.1GHz, 96
GB memory, 1TB SSD, and 8 GeForce GTX 1080 GPU cards. During
both training and evaluation, only 1 GPU card was used.
Baseline. There have been several previous works addressing the
bug-search problem: discovRE [16], Multi-HM andMulti-k-HM [31],
a centroid-based search [10], and Genius [18]. Feng et al. have
demonstrated that the Genius approach is both more accurate and
efficient than the other approaches [18]. Therefore, in our evalua-
tion, we consider two baseline approaches evaluated in [18].
• Bipartite Graph Matching (BGM). Given two binary func-
tions, we directly compute their similarity score on their ACFGs
using the bipartite graph matching as described in Genius. This
approach provides a baseline to evaluate the accuracy of pairwise
graph matching approaches.
• Codebook-basedGraphEmbedding (Genius).This approach
provides a baseline for graph embedding. We contact the authors
2 The code of training and evaluating the pre-trained model is available at
https://github.com/xiaojunxu/dnn-binary-code-similarity.
Training Validation Testing
x86 30,994 3,868 3,973
MIPS 41,477 5,181 5,209
ARM 30,892 3,805 3,966
Total 103,363 12,854 13,148
Table 2: The number of ACFGs in Dataset I
of Genius [18], and obtain the ACFG extraction code and the
codebook used in their evaluation. We further implement the
codebook generation and embedding generation by ourselves
for comparison.
Datasets. In our evaluation, we collect four datasets: (1) Dataset I
for training the neural network and evaluating the accuracy of the
pre-trained model; (2) Dataset II for evaluating the performance
of the task-specific model; (3) Dataset III for efficiency evaluation;
and (4) a vulnerability dataset (Dataset IV) for case studies.
• Dataset I: This dataset is used for neural network training and
baseline comparison. It consists of binaries compiled from source
code, so that we have ground truth. That is, we consider two
ACFGs compiled from the same source code function to be simi-
lar, and those from different functions to be dissimilar. In partic-
ular, we compile OpenSSL (version 1.0.1f and 1.0.1u) using GCC
v5.4. The compiler is set to emit code in x86, MIPS, and ARM,
with optimization levels O0-O3. In total, we obtain 18,269 binary
files containing 129,365 ACFGs. We split Dataset I into three
disjoint subsets of functions for training, validation, and testing
respectively. The statistics are presented in Table 2. During the
split, we guarantee that no two binary functions compiled from
the same source function are separated into two different sets
among training, validation and testing sets. In doing so, we can
examine whether the pre-trained model can generalize to unseen
functions.
• Dataset II: We contact the authors of Genius [18] to get the
same large-scale dataset used in their paper [18] (referred to
as Dataset III in their paper), which includes 33,045 firmware
images. Among these images, 8,128 images can be successfully
unpacked. These images are from 26 different vendors and for
different products such as IP cameras, routers, access points, etc.
• Dataset III: To evaluate the efficiency, we construct a dataset
with ACFGs of various sizes (i.e., number of vertices in a graph).
In particular, we first randomly select 16 firmware images from
Dataset II. From these 16 firmware images, there are 82,100
ACFGs whose sizes range from 1 to 1,306. These ACFGs are
grouped into sets so that all ACFGs in the same set are the same
in size. For any set containing more than 20 ACFGs, we randomly
select 20 ones from the set and remove all other ACFGs. In the
end, we obtain 3,037 ACFGs in this dataset.
• Dataset IV: This dataset contains vulnerable functions obtained
from the vulnerability dataset in [18]. In total, it contains of 154
vulnerable functions.
Training details. Our neural network model is first pre-trained us-
ingDataset I as below.We use the Adam optimization algorithm [27]
and set the learning rate to be 0.0001. We train the Siamese model
for 100 epochs. At each epoch, we first construct the training data
used for this epoch as follows: for each ACFG д in the training
set, we randomly select one ACFG д1 from the set of all ACFGs
compiled from the same source function as д, and one ACFG д2
from the set of all other ACFGs in the training set. Then we gen-
erate two training samples: ⟨д,д1⟩ with ground truth label +1 and
⟨д,д2⟩ with label −1. Notice that since we randomly select д1 and
д2 for each д independently at each epoch, the training data often
vary at different epochs. After the training data is generated for
each epoch, it is randomly shuffled before being fed to the training
process. Each mini-batch contained 10 ACFG pairs. After every
epoch, we measure the loss and AUC on the validation set. During
the 100 training epochs, we save the model that achieved the best
AUC on the validation set.
By default, the embedding size p is 64 and the embedding depth n
is 2. The model runs forT = 5 iterations. The basic-block attributes
include block-level attributes and the number of offspring, i.e., 7
attributes in total.
4.2 Accuracy
In this section, we evaluate the accuracy of the pre-trained model
in Gemini. To this end, we construct a similarity testing dataset as
follows: from the testing set in Dataset I, for each ACFG д in the
set, we randomly select two ACFGs д1,д2 from the testing dataset,
such that the ground truth labels of ⟨д,д1⟩ and ⟨д,д2⟩ are +1 and
−1 (i.e., from the same source function vs. not) respectively. This
similarity testing dataset consists of 26,265 pairs of ACFGs. Note
that the testing set is constructed so that no two binary functions
compiled from the same source appear in both the training set and
the test set. In doing so, we are able to examine the performance of
Gemini on unseen functions. Figure 5a illustrates the ROC curves
for our neural network model (Gemini) as well as two baseline
approaches. We can see that that Gemini outperforms both BGM
and Genius by a large margin.
To further examine the performance of Gemini on graphs with
different sizes, we split the similarity-accuracy testing set into a
large-graph subset and a small-graph subset. The large-graph sub-
set contains only pairs of two ACFGs which both have at least 10
vertices. The small-graph subset contains the rest. The ROC curves
of different approaches evaluated over the large-graph subset and
the small-graph subset are plotted in Figure 5b and Figure 5c re-
spectively. From both figures, we have consistent observations: 1)
Gemini outperforms both BGM and Genius significantly; and 2)
Genius outperforms BGM on small graphs, the BGM performs bet-
ter than Genius on large graphs, and Gemini outperforms both
BGM and Genius on large as well as small graphs.
4.3 Hyperparameters
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of hyperparameters in
the Geminimodel. In particular, we examine the impact of the num-
ber of training epochs, embedding depth, embedding size, ACFG
attributes, and number of iterations. The examination of impact of
the number of training epochs is using the similarity validation set.
We examine other hyperparameters using the similarity testing set.
On the entire similiarty testing set, however, the AUC values are
almost identical. Since we are more interested in the performance
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(c) Results on the small-graph subset
Figure 5: ROC curves for different approaches evaluated on the testing similarity dataset.
of our model on large graphs, the examinations of other hyper-
parameters are using the large-graph subset of the similarity test
set.
Number of epochs.We train the model for 175 epochs and eval-
uate the model over the validation set every 5 epochs for the loss
and the AUC. The results are plotted in Figure 7a and Figure 7b.
From the figures, we can observe that the loss drops to a low value
after 5 training epochs, and then almost remains the same. The
lowest loss appears after the model is trained for 100 epochs. We
make a similar observation for AUC values, although the highest
AUC value appears after the model is trained for 160 epochs. There-
fore, we conclude that the model can be quickly trained to achieve
reasonably good performance (after 5 epochs).
Embedding depth.We vary the number of layers in function σ in
the Gemini model. From Figure 7c, we observe that when embed-
ding depth is 2, the ROC curve has the largest AUC value. Notice
that the original Structure2vec [13] can be viewed as choosing
the embedding depth to be 1. We can observe a clear improvement
by increasing one more non-linear mapping layer to σ . However,
adding more layers does not help much.
Embedding size. In Figure 7d, we can observe that the embedding
size to achieve the outter-most ROC curve is 512. However, all
curves corresponding to the embedding sizes no smaller than 64
are close to each other. Since a large embedding size requires both
longer training time and longer evaluation time, choosing the em-
bedding size to be 64 is a good trade-off between the performance
and efficiency. It is worth to note that even when we choose the
embedding size to be 16, Gemini is still more effective than both
Genius (whose embedding dimensionality is also 16) and BGM.
ACFG attributes.We evaluate the accuracy using three different
ways to extract the attributes to construct ACFGs. In particular, we
consider the attributes to include (1) 6 block-level attributes only
(Block); (2) 6 block-level attributes plus the number of offspring
(Block+O); and (3) all 8 attributes (Block+O+B). From Figure 7e,
we observe that Block+O (7 attributes in total) achieves the best
performance. This is unexpected, since a model using the all at-
tributes (Block+O+B) should be more expressive than the model
using Block+O. We consider this as an overfitting scenario to the
training data. That is, the additional betweeness attribute misleads
the model when computing the embedding.
Number of iterations. From Figure 7f, we observe that the model
achieves the best performance when the number of iterationsT is 5
or larger. This is reasonable, since in this dataset all graphs have a
size larger than 10. It needs 5-hops to propagate local information
on one vertex to most part of the graph.
4.4 Efficiency
We evaluate the efficiency of Gemini and Genius for embedding
generation using Dataset III. In particular, we measure the latency
for the following three tasks: (1) The ACFG extraction time for one
function; (2) The embedding generation time from an ACFG; and (3)
the overall latency for embedding generation (which includes Task
1 and Task 2). Note that we exclude the disassembly time using
IDA pro, since it is the same for both approaches. It usually takes
on the order of seconds to disassemble a binary file, which can be
amortized over all functions in the binary file.
For embedding generation, we implement several versions for
Gemini and Genius respectively. We implement both the CPU and
GPU version of Gemini in Tensorflow. In doing so, we can maxi-
mally leverage the multi-core hardware to accelerate the perfor-
mance. For Genius, we implement a single-threaded version as well
as a multi-threaded version. Since Genius computes the embed-
ding of a ACFG as the similarity scores between this ACFG and
each graph in the codebook using bipartite graph matching, this
can be naturally parallelized such that each thread processes one
graph in the codebook. The multi-threaded version parallelizes
these computations.
ACFG extraction time. Figure 6a (one point for each sample) and
Figure 6b (average extraction time by different ACFG sizes) illus-
trate the results. We can observe that extracting only 6 basic-block
attributes and extracting 6 basic-block attributes along with the
number-of-offspring attribute require similar time, but if we ad-
ditionally extract the betweenness attribute, it takes on average
8× more time. From Figure 6b, we can observe that the extrac-
tion time in general increases along with the ACFG size, but the
variation is large. Notice that Genius requires all 8 attributes to
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Figure 6: Efficiency evaluation on Dataset III. Figure 6a and Figure 6c plot one point for each sample in Dataset III. In Figure 6b
and Figure 6d, we average the running time of all data points with the same ACFG size. Therefore, in these two figures, we
have one data point for each ACFG size. In Figure 6a and Figure 6b, “Block” indicates the extraction time of 6 block-level
attributes; “+O” indicates that the extraction further includes the number-of-offspring attribute; and “+B” indicates the ex-
traction further includes the betweenness attribute. In Figure 6c and Figure 6d, Gemini (CPU) and Gemini (GPU) denote the
CPU and GPU implementations of the Gemini approach respectively. Genius (S) and Genius (M) denote the single-threaded
and multi-threaded implementation of Genius respectively.
achieve its best performance. In contrast, Gemini can aggregate
the graph structural information through iterations of embedding
updates, and thus can achieve the best performance without the
costly betweenness-attribute computation. Therefore, Gemini can
improve upon Genius by 8× on average on ACFG extraction.
Embedding generation time. Embedding generation time is pre-
sented in Figure 6c and Figure 6d. We can observe that the CPU
implementation of Gemini runs 2400× to 16000× faster than the
multi-threaded version of Genius. On average, the speedup can be
as high as 7000×. We attribute this to several reasons. First, the
Gemini approach avoids the expensive graph matching algorithm
and reduces the time complexity to the number of edges in the
graph. Since ACFGs are sparse graphs, i.e., each vertex’s out-degree
is at most 2, the computation cost is almost linear to the graph
size. Second, most computations in the Gemini method can be
implemented as matrix operations: matrix multiplication, matrix
summation, and element-wise operations over a matrix. All these
operations can be parallelized to utilize the underlying multi-core
CPUs to achieve speedups with respect to the number of cores. On
the other hand, the graph matching algorithm in Genius cannot
be easily parallelized. The only speedup comes from processing
each element in the codebook in parallel, and thus this speedup is
bounded by the number of elements in the codebook. Later, our
analysis will show that it is hard to achieve the upper bound of this
theoretical speedup in Genius, i.e., the codebook size.
Nowwe compare the single-threaded version andmulti-threaded
version of Genius and show that it is hard to achieve the theoreti-
cal upper bound of the speedup, i.e., the codebook size. Although
the multi-threaded version can run up to 10× faster, the average
speedup is just 35%. One reason is that when the codebook used
in Genius contains a large graph with more than 500 vertices, the
time to process this element dominates the overall feature gen-
eration time when the ACFG being processed is small. Further,
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Figure 7: Effectiveness of different hyperparameters of NN. Figure 7a and Figure 7b are evaluated over the similarity validation
set. Figure 7c, 7d, 7e, and 7f are evaluated over large-graph subset of the similarity testing set.
synchronization of multi-threading introduces additional overhead.
Figure 6c and Figure 6d support this observation: (1) when the
ACFG is small, the multi-threaded version is similar or even slower
than the single-threaded version; and (2) when the ACFG becomes
larger, the speedup of multi-threaded also increases.
We further examine the performance of Gemini on GPU. How-
ever, we observe that the GPU version is on average 10% slower than
the CPU version. This happens mostly on embedding generation
for small graphs. On larger graphs, the GPU version can run faster
than the CPU version by up to 70%. We attribute this observation
to the fact that the GPU version requires additional overhead, i.e.,
allocating GPU memory and copying data from the main memory
to the GPU memory, before the computation. Therefore, as the
ACFG becomes larger, this overhead becomes insignificant when
compared with the overall time for computing the embedding.
Overall latency of embedding generation. The embedding gen-
eration time for Genius includes ACFG extraction time for both
block-level and inter-block features (i.e., Block+O+B in Figure 6a)
as well as the multi-threaded CPU implementation of feature en-
coding (i.e., Genius (M) in Figure 6c). For Gemini, the embedding
generation time includes ACFG extraction time for block-level fea-
tures and the number of offspring (i.e., Block+O in Figure 6a) as
well as the CPU implementation of graph embedding (i.e., Gemini
(CPU) in Figure 6c). We observe that Gemini can achieve a speedup
ranging from 27.7× to 11625.5×. On average, Gemini runs 386.4×
faster than Genius.
4.5 Training time
Although offline training time will be amortized over a large num-
ber of online queries, the release of new firmware images may
require the learning model to be updated on a monthly-basis or
even weekly-basis to more accurately model the data. Therefore,
we briefly compare the training time of Genius and Gemini.
The Genius approach needs to compute a codebook using an
unsupervised learning algorithm called spectral clustering. This
algorithm requires constructing a distance matrix which requires
quadratic time complexity on the size of the training data. As a
result, when the training data contains 100,000 functions (which
is used to construct the codebook in our previous experiments),
Genius takes more than one week to construct the codebook.
In contrast, since Gemini model runs only a fixed number of
epochs, its running time is linear to the number of epochs and also
linear to the number of samples in each epoch, i.e., the training
dataset. In our experiment, each epoch contains around 206,000
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Figure 8: Visualizing the embeddings of the different func-
tions using t-SNE. Each color indicates one source functions.
The legend provides the source function names.
training samples and takes less than 5 minutes to run. Earlier we
have shown that the Gemini model requires only 5 epochs of train-
ing to achieve a reasonable performance, while running for 100
epochs gives the best performance. That means, Gemini requires
less than 30 minutes (5 epochs) to train a model to outperform
Genius, while achieving the best performance requires less than 10
hours. Therefore, our neural network-based approach allows the
model to be updated more frequently than Genius. This property is
crucial to make retraining and model update practical.
4.6 Understanding the Embeddings
Wevisualize the embeddings computed using the task-independently
pre-trained embedding network to understand its effectiveness. In
particular, we randomly select 5 source functions, and compute the
embeddings of the corresponding binary functions compiled us-
ing different compilers, different target architectures, and different
optimization-levels. We then use t-SNE [46] to project the high-
dimensional embeddings onto a 2-D plane. We plot the projected
points in Figure 8, and different source functions are presented
in different colors. We can observe that (1) binary functions com-
piled from the same source function are close to each other; and
(2) binary functions compiled from different source functions are
far from each other. Therefore, this visualization illustrates that
our task-independent pre-trained embedding function can preserve
the information of the source function in the embeddings regard-
less of the target architectures, the compilers being used, and the
optimization levels.
4.7 Accuracy of Task-specific Retrained Model
using Real-world Dataset
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our task-specific
retraining approach using real-world firmware images. The evalua-
tion is setup in the same way as in [18]. We extract the ACFGs of
functions in Dataset II, which in total result in 420,558,702 functions.
We further choose two vulnerabilities from Dataset IV, which are
the same as used in [18]. For each vulnerability, we consider it as a
specific task to search for as many functions as possible in Dataset I
that contain the same vulnerability. To achieve this, we retrain the
model from the one pre-trained on Dataset I.
To compare with [18], which inspects only the top-50 most simi-
lar results, we also evaluate the precision among the top-50 func-
tions. We show that Gemini, through retraining, can achieve over
80% accuracy for each task among top 50 results, which is signifi-
cantly better than prior art [18] whose accuracy is around 20% to
50%. We present the details below. In total, our approach allows
identifying more than 25 novel vulnerable firmware images on
average from than Genius among the top-50 results.
Retraining effectiveness.We perform retraining in an iterative
manner. At the beginning, we have a pre-trained model, and use
it to compute the embeddings of all functions in the target corpus
to build an index. In this case, each query can be handled within
3 seconds. We manually inspect the top-K (e.g., K = 50) results,
and assign ground truth labels for each of them so that the top-K
results are used for retraining. After each iteration of retraining,
we re-compute the embeddings for a subset (e.g., 10%) randomly
sampled from the entire target corpus to get a new list of top-K
results. We repeat this process for several iterations. In practice,
our experiments show that we only need very few iterations of
retraining. Note that the Genius approach does not provide the
flexibility to incorporate such additional supervision efficiently.
Thus the retraining process is a unique advantage of our approach
over Genius and allows our approach to achieve higher accuracy
with additional supervision from domain experts.
In particular, we use the same two vulnerabilities as used in
Genius, i.e., CVE-2015-1791 and CVE-2014-3508, since Genius [18]
provides reference results. For CVE-2015-1791, we find that af-
ter only 1 iteration of retraining, our approach discovers 42 true
positives from four vendors such as D-Link, ZyXEL, DD-wrt, and
Tomato by Shibby, among top-50 results. Further, among top-100
results, our approach discovers 85 true positives. These results show
that one retraining iteration helps improve the precision to over
84%. As a reference, Genius can detect only 14 vulnerable firmware
images (a precision at 28%), and they are only from D-Link and
Belkin.
CVE-2014-3508 is harder, since the control flow graphs do not
change before or after the patch, but only one more instruction, i.e.,
storing a zero value into the memory buffer, is inserted as the patch.
Using our approach, after 3 iterations of retraining, our approach
identifies 41 firmware images among the top-50 results that are
vulnerable, which results in a 82% precision. In comparison, Genius
can identify only 24 vulnerable firmware images (a precision at
48%) among the top-50 results.
Retraining time. In terms of time consumption, for each itera-
tion, we retrain the model for 5 epochs, and sample 10% of the
entire dataset for evaluation (as discussed earlier). Notice that in
the second step, the ACFGs did not need to be regenerated, and
thus we only need to pay the cost for embedding computation. The
overall time of these two automated steps can be done within 2
hours for each iteration. In terms of manual investigation time, we
find that an experienced expert can finish the manual investigation
of 50 candidates within 2 hours. This time can be even shorter for
later iterations, since the vulnerable code is already familiar to the
experts after the first iteration of investigation. In total, a human
expert spend less than 12 hours in going through three iterations to
train an effective model for a given vulnerability. Once the model is
deployed to the entire dataset, it took around 12 hours to generate
the embeddings for the entire dataset.
Therefore, we conclude that the retraining capability of our
approach enables practical usage of feedback from human experts
to increase the search accuracy within a reasonable amount of time,
i.e., within one day.
5 RELATEDWORK
We have discussed closely related work throughout the paper. In
this section, we briefly survey additional related work. We focus on
approaches using code similarity for known bugs search without
source code. Other approaches for finding unknown bugs [3, 8, 9,
34, 42–44] will not be discussed in this section. For learning-based
bug search [18], we have already discussed the comparison earlier
in the paper.
Raw feature based bug search.Many researchers have already
worked on the problem of bug search in binaries, and made great
contribution towards this direction. Fundamentally, they rely on
various raw features directly extracted from binary for code simi-
larity matching. N-grams or N-perms [26] are two early approaches
for the bug search. They adopt the binary sequence or mnemonic
codematchingwithout understanding the semantics of code [25], so
they cannot tolerate the opcode reordering issue caused by different
compilations. To further improve the accuracy, the tracelet-based
approach [14] captures execution sequences as features for code
similarity checking, which can address the opcode changes issue.
TEDEM [32] captures semantics using the expression tree for each
basic block. However, the opcode and register names are different
across architectures, so these two approaches are not suitable for
finding bugs cross architectures.
Many other approaches can be used for bug search in the cross-
architecture setting, but they are expensive to be applied for large
scale firmware bug search. Zynamics BinDiff[15] and BinSlayer [6]
adopt the expensive graph isomorphism algorithm to quantify the
similarity between control flow graphs for code search. The sym-
bolic execution and theorem prover used in BinHunt[20] and iBin-
Hunt [29] are by design expensive, since they need to extract the
equations and conduct the equivalent checking.
Although Pewny et al. [31] use MinHash to reduce code similar-
ity computation, their graph matching algorithm is still too expen-
sive to handle millions of graph pairs. DiscovRE [16] utilizes the
pre-filtering to boost CFG based matching process by eliminating
unnecessary matching pairs, but the pre-filtering is unreliable and
outputs tremendous false negatives [18]. Many other approaches,
such as Costin et al. [11], are indeed efficient when searching bugs
at large scale, but they are only designed for specific bugs with
obvious artifacts, and cannot handle more general cases.
Graph embedding. Graph analysis has its significance in various
real-world application, such as biology [13] and social network [19].
Typically, there are two different meaning of graph embedding that
are used in graph analysis. The first one is to embed the nodes of a
graph. This means finding a map from the nodes to a vector space,
so that the structural information of the graph is preserved [21].
Among early approaches, LLE[36] finds the embedding vectors so
that the embedding of a node is a linear combination of the nodes
near it. In [4], the embedding of two nodes are close to each other
when the weight of the edge between them is large. Recently, deep-
learning-based method is adopted to deal with large scale graph
dataset.
Another meaning of graph embedding, which is adopted in this
paper, is to find a embedding vector that represents the whole graph.
After that, people can perform machine learning methods on it to
deal with tasks like protein design and gene analysis [39]. Currently,
kernel method [38] is a widely used technique for processing struc-
tural data like sequences[17] and graphs[5].
The key to the kernel method is a carefully designed kernel func-
tion (a positive semidefinite function between pairs of nodes). A
class of kernels are designed by counting the elementary structures
that appears in the graph. For example, [33] counts specific sub-
tree patterns in a graph; [41] counts the appearance of subgraph
with specific sizes; in [40], different structures will be counted in
a process named Weisfeiler-Lehman algorithm. However, in these
methods the kernels are fixed before learning, so the embedding
space may have very large dimensions.
Another class of kernels leverages the fact that graphical models
can take into account structured data with noise and variations.
Two representative examples are the Fisher kernel [23] and the
probability product kernel [24]. These kernels fit graphical models
for input graphs and use some form of inner product between the
distributions as the kernel function. The model applied in our pa-
per, Structure2vec[13], also construct graphical models for input
graphs, and parameterize the inference algorithms of graphical
models by neural network to define features for the corresponding
kernel function.
Deep learning-based graph embedding approaches. Scarselli
et al. proposed the first graph neural network to compute embed-
dings of a graph [37]. Li et al. extend [37] by using Gated Recurrent
Unit (GRU) to generate features. Dai et al. generalize both works
using principled graphical model thinking which allows more flex-
ible embedding functions to be defined [13]. Therefore, we use a
variant of [13] as our embedding generation function.
There is another line of research to generate graph embeddings
from large networks such as social-networks [22, 30, 45, 47]. These
works focus on unsupervised learning or semi-supervised learning
and generating features of different nodes in a graph rather than the
embeddings of the entire graph. Using these approaches, it is also
not easy to incorporate the additional training data into retraining,
and thus they are not suitable for our problem.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a deep neural network-based approach to
generate embeddings for binary functions. We implement a proto-
type called Gemini. Our extensive evaluation shows that Gemini
outperforms the the state-of-the-art approaches by large margins
with respect to similarity detection accuracy, embedding generation
time, and overall training time. Our real world case studies demon-
strate that using retraining Gemini can identify significantly more
vulnerable firmware images than the state-of-the-art, i.e., Genius.
Our research showcases a successful application of deep learning
on computer security problems.
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